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HOLMES ON 'PEERLESS': RAFFLES V WICHELHA US AND
THE OBJECTIVE THEORY OF CONTRACTt
Robert L. Birmingham*
The familiar case Raffles v. Wichelhaus is ordinarily read subjectively: the minds of the
parties do not meet hence the parties do not contract. Holmes sought to explain Raffles objec-
tively, and is widely thought to have failed. The ground of Holmes' explanation is that the
parties, by saying 'Peerless' not merely meant different things, but said different things. In
support of Holmes' explanation, Professor Birmingham distinguishes syntactical, that isphys-
ical linguistic properties from semantical such properties; those based on reference or mean-
ing. Holmes, as Professor Birmingham understands him, does not need recourse to
meanings, and would have contract depend only on the coreference of the language of the
parties, not on the correspondence of their language or thought.
Early in Lecture IX of The Common Law, Holmes described
Raffles v. Wichelhaus:1
The defendant agreed to buy, and the plaintiff agreed to sell, a cargo of
cotton, 'to arrive ex Peerless from Bombay.' There were two such vessels
sailing from Bombay, one in October, the other in December. The plain-
tiff meant the latter, the defendant the former. It was held that the de-
fendant was not bound to accept the cotton.2
Raffles is interesting as an intellectual puzzle and as currently
respected law.3 Also, as "that darling of first-year students,"' 4 it is a
familiar case that we should get right.
Holmes continued:
It is commonly said that such a contract is void, because of mutual mis-
take of the subject-matter, and because therefore the parties did not con-
sent to the same thing. But this way of putting it seems to me misleading.
The law has nothing to do with the actual state of the parties' minds. In
contract, as elsewhere, it must go by externals, and judge parties by their
t © Copyright 1985, Robert L. Birmingham.
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. A.B. 1960; J.D. 1963, University of Pitts-
burgh; LL.M. 1965, Harvard University; Ph.D. (Econ.) 1967; Ph.D. (Phil.) 1976, University of Pitts-
burgh. I thank Nancy Dunham for her help researching and editing this paper.
1. 2 H. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864).
2. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 309 (1881).
3. For instance, in Flower City Painting Contractors, Inc. v. Gumina Constr. Co., 591 F.2d
162 (2d Cir. 1979), a contractor and his subcontractor differently understood the latter's painting
duties, neither party, as the formula goes, suspecting or having reason to suspect this difference. The
court on the authority of "the famous 'Peerless' case" decided "no enforceable contract ever came
into existence." Id. at 165, 166.
4. Kaplan, Encounters with Holmes, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1828, 1834 (1983).
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conduct.5
No surprises: Hart observes, objectivity was "something of an obses-
sion" with Holmes.6
Holmes read Raffles objectively:
If there had been but one "Peerless," and the defendant had said "Peer-
less," by mistake, meaning "Peri," he would have been bound. The true
ground of the decision was not that each party meant a different thing
from the other, but that each said a different thing. The plaintiff offered
one thing, the defendant expressed his assent to another.7
Superficially, the passage is unsettling. As Eisenberg remarks, it
seems "Holmes had it precisely backward."'8 Surely, Raffles and
Wichelhaus said 'Peerless' identically; yet Holmes apparently denied
they did.
We turn for instruction to Gilmore's elegant The Death of Con-
tract.9 Kaplan's casual comment that Gilmore there "had some legiti-
mate sport with Holmes and the Peerless"10 signals the authority of
Gilmore's view: the legal literature assumes its correctness. Gilmore
dismissed Holmes' exegesis of Raffles as an episode of Holmes' ef-
forts-which Gilmore said attained "instant and spectacular suc-
cess"1 1-to replace the then current subjective theory of contract
formation with the objective theory.
A first pass at the competing theories gives:
Subjective Theory: There is a contract if and only if the minds of
the parties meet.
Objective Theory: There is a contract according only to the out-
ward manifestations of the parties.
The objective theory may be restated more awkwardly, but congru-
ently with the statement of the subjective theory: 'There is a contract
if and only if the manifestations (not the minds) of the parties meet'.
Although Gilmore's Holmes was "willing to accept Raffles as a
correctly decided case," he "insisted that it must be explained 'objec-
tively.' "12 Gilmore described Holmes' Raffles as "altogether aston-
5. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 309.
6. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 242 (1968).
7. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 309.
8. Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1107, 1123 (1984).
9. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRAcT 18 (1974).
10. Kaplan, supra note 4, at 1834.
11. G. GILMORE, supra note 9, at 18.
12. Id at 42.
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ishing" and "an extraordinary tour de force"; 13 Gilmore added, the
"magician who could 'objectify' "Raffles "could, the need arising, ob-
jectify anything."' 14 We may summarize Gilmore's contentions, inter-
pretable as impugning the integrity of Holmes' scholarship, thus:
Holmes wanted contract law to be objective; Raffles cannot be inter-
preted objectively; Holmes, perhaps disingenuously, just declared that
Raffles can be interpreted objectively, and moved on.
Gilmore explained Holmes' passage implausibly. First, Gilmore,
who had no qualms about calling Langdell, for instance, "stupid,"
conceded Holmes was not, so we may concede this too.'5 Then con-
sider an argument originating with Aristotle, which we treat in the
form given it by Tertullian (c. 160-c. 220). Tertullian, although a the-
ologian, was thought, perhaps falsely, to have been trained in Roman
law, as were many Church Fathers. Tertullian defended the dogma
that Christ was incarnate by arguing somewhat effectively that at least
it was not fabricated, it being so implausible that anybody fabricating
a dogma would choose a different, more believable, dogma.16 The po-
sition Gilmore attributed to Holmes regarding Raffles is transparently
false. It is, consequently, unlikely to have been Holmes' position:
Holmes, although he might have been wrong, would not have been
transparently wrong; and it is improbable that he disingenuously ar-
gued such a weak case.
I.
Gilmore, while discussing consideration, not formation, but
speaking generally, contended that Holmes "was not in the least inter-
ested in stating or restating the common law as it was."' 17 According
to Gilmore, Holmes' thesis was entirely normative, not partly descrip-
tive, roughly: 'Contract law should be objective (regardless of
whether actually it is objective)'.
By Holmes' objective theory, whether parties contract depends
only on observables. Gilmore stated thus its consequent advantages
over the subjective theory it replaced.
13. Id at 40, 41.
14. Id. at 41.
15. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AtmRICAN LAW 42, 56 (1977).
16. Sider, Credo Quia Absurdum?, 73 CLASSiCAL WORLD 417 (1980). For the view that there
were two Tertullians, the other one a jurist, see Martini, Tertuliano Giurista e Tertulliano Padre
della Chiesa, 41 STUDIA ET DOCUMENTA HIsrORIAE ET IuRis 79 (1975).
17. G. GrLmORE, supra note 9, at 20.
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Now, if you accept the result of a case, what difference does it make how
you explain the result? In this context I think that it makes a good deal
of difference. If ("in contract, as elsewhere") the "actual state of the
parties' minds" is relevant, then each litigated case must become an ex-
tended inquiry into what was "intended," "meant," "believed" and so
on. If, however, we can restrict ourselves to the "externals" (what the
parties "said" or "did"), then the factual inquiry will be much simplified
18
Here is Gilmore commenting on how Holmes reconciled the case
law:
[He] made industrious use of whatever bits and pieces of case law, old
and new, could be made to fit the theory. Such cases were immediately
promoted to "leading cases" and made to fit-in much the same way that
Procrustes made his guests fit. Cases which could not be made to fit were
ignored or dismissed, with Langdellian certitude, as "wrong." 19
Therefore, according to Gilmore, Holmes puts cases into two catego-
ries: "'leading cases' . . . made to fit"; and cases "ignored or dis-
missed. . . as 'wrong.' "20
If, as Gilmore said, Holmes was not interested in restating the
common law, Holmes would not have tested his theory against the
cases. Also, if we accept Gilmore's interpretation of Holmes on Raf-
fles, by which Holmes did not come close to making the case fit the
objective theory, Holmes miscategorized the case; if it could not be
made to fit, Holmes would have more properly ignored it or dismissed
it as wrong.
Holmes' thesis is better interpreted to have a descriptive compo-
nent besides its normative component, being something like: 'Con-
tract law is objective (which is a good thing)'. This thesis, but not
Gilmore's version, would have motivated Holmes to show that his
theory reconciles the case law at least as well as does the subjective
theory.
Holmes, trying to show contract law is objective, practiced sci-
ence, exactly as Langdell prescribed.21 Cases were data (observa-
18. Id. at 42 (quoting O.W. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 309).
19. Id at 17-18.
20. Id at 42.
21. Langdell "believed that law was a science, like any other science." Id at 12. Gilmore
probably intended to attribute unscientific behavior to Holmes by the passage quoted supra text
accompanying note 19; at least he was mocking gently. But Holmes was not doing normal science.
And physical scientists, in times of paradigm shift, likewise behave in ways a layperson would con-
sider outrageous. See, eg., Earman & Glymore, The Gravitational Red Shift as a Test of General
Relativity: History and Analysis, 11 STUD. Hisr. & PHIL. ScI. 175 (1980); Pickering, Against Putting
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tions); Holmes constructed legal rules (laws) to explain them.
Ordinarily, a scientific theory neither explains nor is consistent with
all the data. If simple, elegant, or useful, it can get observations
wrong without disqualifying itself; we regard nonconforming data as
misspecified, or resulting from random perturbations not invalidating
the theory. Newton explained most planetary motion by gravity; he
attributed the rest, however, to "interference by angels."' 22 Could
Holmes have said a case seemingly requiring the subjective theory is
wrong, the judges being equivalent in law to angels in Newtonian
physics?
Not if the case is Raffles, as is evident from Holmes' footnote to
the passage about Raffles. The footnote reads: "Raffles v.
Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906. Cf. Kyle v. Kavanaugh, 103 Mass. 356,
357."23 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, before which
Holmes practiced while writing The Common Law, had decided Kyle
in 1869, twelve years before Holmes published. In Kyle, "the Massa-
chusetts court came out exactly the same way the English [Raffles]
court had and put the result expressly on the ground that the minds of
the parties had not met." 24 The litigants in Kyle agreed about the sale
of property described as "on Prospect Street" in Waltham.25 Their
description failed as a definite description, however, there being two
Prospect Streets in that town. Holmes' footnote cited to a part of the
trial court's charge to the jury that the supreme judicial court sus-
tained on appeal, which instructed: "[I]f the defendant was negotiat-
ing for one thing and the plaintiff was selling another thing, and if
their minds did not agree as to the subject matter of the sale, they
could not be said to have agreed and to have made a contract. '26
Gilmore offered Raffles and Kyle as "exhibit[s] to prove that the
courts, well past .the midpoint of the nineteenth century, were ap-
proaching the problem of formation of contract from a purely subjec-
tivist point of view." 27 Imagine, as did Gilmore, that Kyle and Raffles
are explanatory successes of the pre-Holmesian subjective theory.
the Phenomena First: The Discovery of the Weak Neutral Current, 15 STUD. HIST. & PHIL. Sci. 85
(1984).
22. Scriven, Explanation and Prediction in Evolutionary Theory, in MAN AND NATURE 213,
214 (IL Munson ed. 1971).
23. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 242 n.1.
24. G. GILMORE, supra note 9, at 40.
25. Kyle v. Kavanaugh, 103 Mass. 356, 356 (1869).
26. Id at 357.
27. G. GILMoRE, supra note 9, at 39.
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They must have been significant cases for Holmes: both relatively re-
cent, one prestigiously English, the other decided in that leading
American jurisdiction that comprised the community Holmes ex-
pected to evaluate his work in the first instance. If his thesis was
partly intended to be descriptive, if he had some interest in reconciling
cases to theory, Holmes could not persuasively substitute for the sub-
jective theory an objective theory that failed to explain, and explain
well, Kyle and Raffles.
II.
As a reference point, imagine a pathologically objective theory of
contract, which Holmes would have adopted if he could have recon-
ciled Raffles with it. We may build such an objective theory begin-
ning with the Restatements of Contracts. Both Restatements give the
genus of contract thus:
Definition (in part): A contract is a promise or a set of promises. 28
The definition is Williston's. Contracts might be entities other
than promises, that are caused by or arise from promises. Cook com-
plained that we should separate "the 'factual events' (the promises)"
from "the resulting 'legal relations' attached by the law to the
promises."'29
Definition (in part): A promise is a manifestation.30
This is the second Restatement, not the first.3' We have a classic
equivocation. A manifestation may be a manifesting: an act. Or it
may be a manifested: what the act indicates, its content. Kant equiv-
ocated this way, over 'representation' (Vorstellung).32 Restatement
Second adopts manifestings: "'Promise' . . . denotes the act of the
28. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1
(1981).
29. Cook, Villiston on Contracts, 33 ILL. L. REv. 497, 501 (1939).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(a) (1981).
31. In terms of the equivocation indicated in the text infra, the original Restatement had it
both ways. Section 2(l) said a "promise is an undertaking," thereby suggesting promises are
manifesteds; however, its comment a hedged: "'promise' means both physical manifestations by
words or acts of assurance and the moral duty to make good the assurance by performance." RE-
STATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 2 comment a (1932).
32. Sellars, Some Remarks on Kant's Theory of Experience, 64 J. PHIL. 633, 633 (1967). Such
equivocation is not confined to Kant or to German metaphysics. See, eg., 1 S. ALEXANDER, SPACE,
TIME, AND DErrY 11-13, 16-26 (1920).
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promisor. '33
Imagine we write 'Williston' twice, and ask, 'How many words
have we written?' The question equivocates, its answer being 'One' if
word types (patterns) are intended, 'Two' if word tokens (exemplifica-
tions) are intended.3 4 The Restatements' manifestations are tokens:
physical particulars (noises or inscriptions). Consequently, contracts,
according to this objective theory, are sets of noises or inscriptions.
Murray decides otherwise:
Frequently the word "contract" is used to refer to the written me-
morial (the signed writing) or other utterance that evidences a legally
enforceable promise or group of promises. The writing is not the con-
tract; the words the parties use if they contract orally is [sic] not the
contract. . . .All these manifestations are mere evidence of the con-
tract. Where is the contract? One cannot touch, hear, smell or feel the
contract.35
But by this objective theory, a contract is something we can "hear" if
it is oral, and "touch" or "feel" it if it is written. Ordinarily, though,
a contract doesn't smell much.36
Only some promises are contracts. Which? According to the
Restatements, those "for the breach of which the law gives a rem-
edy."' 37 Well, we know that. But whether the law gives a remedy is
what we are using the concept of contract to decide. A theory of
contract specifies sentence tokens or sets of sentence tokens that are
contracts. A model for a theory of contract is a grammar-a theory
specifying which linguistic sequences are well-formed.3 8
Think of a linguistic token (expression), for example,
Holmes.
Among its properties are those belonging only to expressions, and re-
lating only to inspectable characteristics of them: its syntactical
properties. The specification of a syntactical property "makes no ref-
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 comment a (1981).
34. The distinction is Peirce's. Letter from Charles Sanders Peirce to Lady Welby (Oct. 12,
1904), reprinted in 8 COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE § 8.334 (1958), also re-
printed in SEMIOTICS AND SIGNIFICS: CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CHARLES S. PEIRCE AND VIC-
TORIA LADY WELBY 22, 32-33 (C. Hardwick ed. 1977).
35. J. MURRAY, Introduction to CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 3-4 (3d ed. 1983).
36. See generally Bloomfield, Language or Ideas?, 12 LANGUAGE 89, 93 (1936).
37. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1
(1981).
38. W. QuINE, The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEw
47, 4849 (2d ed. rev. 1961).
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erence either to the speaker or to the designata of the expressions, but
attends strictly to the expressions and their forms (the ways expres-
sions are constructed out of signs in determinate order). ' 39 For exam-
ple, having six letters is a syntactical property of 'Holmes'. Lem
starts a story: "Trurl the constructor put together a machine that
could create anything starting with n." 4 Starting with 'n' is a syntac-
tical property of a thing's name.
Two aspects make the idea of a syntactical property more gen-
eral. Pieces of language need not look alike to be classified together.
For instance, 'N' and 'n' are differently shaped but count as the same
letter. Second, significant as reinforcing the idea that a contract can
be formed without speaking or writing, what is linguistic should be
interpreted broadly. At the extreme, the anthropologist Levi-Strauss
includes kinship structures, patterns of familial relations, as linguistic:
women are words, which men exchange.4 1 Levi-Strauss adds some-
what redemptively: "[W]oman could never become just a sign and
nothing more, since even in a man's world she is still a person."42
The first Restatement aspired to make being a contract a syntac-
tical property of promises. Regarding consideration, it illustrated:
A wishes to make a binding promise to his son B to convey to B Black-
acre, which is worth $5000. Being advised that a gratuitous promise is
not binding, A writes to B an offer to sell Blackacre for $1. B accepts.
B's promise to pay $1 is sufficient consideration. 43
To find out if there is consideration for A's promise, one inspects only
the pieces of language; the form, 'I will sell Blackacre for $X', dis-
closes all. What A wishes does not matter. The revised Restatement,
however, rejects the strictly syntactical test:
A desires to make a binding promise to give $1000 to his son B. Being
advised that a gratuitous promise is not binding, A offers to buy from B
for $1000 a book worth less than $1. B accepts the offer knowing that the
purchase of the book is a mere pretense. There is no consideration for
A's promise to pay $1000. 44
Here, contract turns also on what A desires and B knows, so besides
39. R. CARNAP, INTRODUCTION TO SYMBOLIC LOGIC AND ITS APPLICATIONS 79 (1958).
40. S. LEM, THE CYBERIAD 9 (1976).
41. C. LEvi-STRAUSS, THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP 496 (rev. ed. 1969).
42. Id
43. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 84 comment b, illustration 1 (1932).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 comment b, illustration 5 (1981). The il-
lustrations are juxtaposed in L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 12 (4th ed.
1981).
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isolating a token of 'I will sell X book for $1", these must be inquired
into.
Schematically, a purely syntactical theory of contract would con-
sist of sentences like:
If what A says has the same shape as what B says, modulo 'offer' for
'accept', there is a contract.
What A says and what B says are tokens whose sameness is a syntacti-
cal property that goes to their classification as types.
Holmes sometimes presumed this theory, most conspicuously in
his lecture The Path of the Law, where he said the existence of a con-
tract depends on "agreement of two sets of external signs," and spoke
of a sign as sometimes something "tangible, for instance, a letter."' 45
Gilmore recognized that this strictly objective theory cannot succeed
in the face of Raffles, and that Holmes therefore could not adhere to
it. The parties to Raffles said the same thing syntactically, that is,
'Peerless'. If this alone mattered, Raffles and Wichelhaus would have
contracted; but they did not.
III.
Blanshard speculates how various writers would restate 'He was
hanged': 'He was hanged' (Swift, Macaulay, Shaw); 'He was killed'
(Bradley); 'He died' (Bosanquet); 'His mortal existence achieved its
termination' (Kant); and, concluding the series, 'A finite determina-
tion of infinity had been further determined by its own negation'
(Hegel).46 Evidently, for Blanshard, Hegel provides a paradigm of
unperspicuous thought and prose. But Blanshard remarks elsewhere
that Wittgenstein "has the strange distinction of having produced a
work on logic [the Tractatus47] beside which the Logic of Hegel is
luminously intelligible. '48
In sections 5.54 et seq. of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein investi-
gated sentences of the form 'A believes that p', which apparently re-
late a person (A) to a proposition (p). "But it is clear," he said,
coming to the obscure part, that they "are of the form '"p' says p' ";
"[t]his shows that there is no such thing as the soul . ."49
45. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 464 (1897).
46. B. BLANSHARD, ON PHILOSOPHICAL STYLE 31 (1954).
47. L. WrIrGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (1922).
48. B. BLANSHARD, REASON AND ANALYsIs 120 (1962).
49. L. WrrrGENsTEIN, supra note 47, at §§ 5.54-.5421. 'Seele' is translated 'soul' here but
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Blanshard50 explains that Wittgenstein in these sections was mo-
tivated by two overlapping concerns. First, he wanted to avoid posit-
ing mental entities such as beliefs, these being unobservable. Gilmore,
of course, explained that Holmes shared this concern by restricting
inquiry about contract to externals, not intentions and beliefs.51
Second, less familiarly, Wittgenstein wanted language to be ex-
tensional. A linguistic entity composed of others, such as a sentence,
is extensional if what it refers to is a function only of what its parts
refer to. Names interpreted extensionally refer to individuals:
'Wichelhaus' refers to Wichelhaus. They are interpreted nonexten-
sionally (intensionally) in terms of their meanings. 52 Sentences refer
to truth values: T or F. One may interpret 'It is not the case that
Peerless sails tomorrow' extensionally, because the complete sentence
refers to T if its embedded sentence, 'Peerless sails tomorrow', refers
to F, and conversely. But superficially, as Wittgenstein said, a sen-
tence such as 'Wichelhaus believes that Peerless sails tomorrow',
which has the form 'A believes that p', is intensional. Its truth value
seems not a function of the trutb value of its embedded sentence:
whether Peerless sails tomorrow or not, Wichelhaus may or may not
believe that it will.
Therefore, according to Blanshard, Wittgenstein told us to read
'Wichelhaus believes that Peerless sails tomorrow', as equivalent to
'Wichelhaus says, 'Peerless sails tomorrow'', which has the un-
problematic parts 'Wichelhaus', referring to Wichelhaus, and ''Peer-
less sails tomorrow'', referring to a sentence token. The substituted
sentence's truth value, what it refers to, is a function of what these
expressions refer to; hence we may interpret it extensionally.
Gilmore discussed Holmes' argument satirically. Blanshard's at-
titude and style are strikingly like Gilmore's. Blanshard, introducing
Wittgenstein's analysis, asks, "How was the philosopher to escape
from the dreadful abyss [of nonextensionality] that thus opened at his
feet?" 53 Blanshard answers, incredulous:
might be translated 'mind'. S. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIvATE LANGUAGE 48
n.31, 127 n.11, 130-31 n.12, 133 (1982).
50. B. BLANsHARD, supra note 48, at 197-205. Interpretations of §§ 5.54-.5421 besides Blan-
shard's include, classically, Ramsey, Review of 'Tractatus', in ESSAYS ON WITrGENSTEIN'S
Tractatus 9, 13 (I. Copi & R. Beard 1966); and, recently, Dayton, Tractatus 5.54-5.5422, 6 CAN. J.
PHIL. 275 (1976); Ishiguro, Representation: An Investigation Based on a Passage in the Tractatus, in
FORMS OF REPRESENTATION 189 (B. Freed, A. Marras & P. Maynard eds. 1975).
51. See supra text accompanying note 18; G. GILMORE, supra note 9, at 20.
52. D. LEwis, 'Tensions, in I PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 250 (1983).
53. B. BLANSHARD, supra note 48, at 202.
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[Wittgenstein] saw that he could save himself and this precious jewel of
the extensionalist logic if he could deny that in referring to the proposi-
tion believed by [Wichelhaus] he was referring to a proposition at all.
This he did. What he was really asserting, he suggested, was not that
[Wichelhaus] believed the proposition P, but that he said P; that is, he
uttered the words of the sentence. The inexorable demands of logic were
thus triumphantly met. The assertion made no claim beyond the strictly
empirical one that [Wichelhaus's] body was issuing certain noises, and
these could be directly verified. The relief to the philosopher's mind may
be imagined when this solution came into sight. He had saved the doc-
trine about compound propositions, and he had achieved it at no greater
cost than that of the archaic and indefensible dogma that other people
have desires and beliefs. 54
Holmes on Raffles and the teaching of the Tractatus are remark-
ably alike. Also, compare Holmes' insistence that the parties in Raf-
fles not merely meant but said different things with the Tractatus'
analysis of the 'green's in '(Mr.) Green is green': "[T]hese words do
not merely have different meanings: they are different symbols."55
We come tantalizingly close to explaining the similarities between
Holmes and Wittgenstein by the American philosopher Peirce influ-
encing both.
Peirce and Holmes belonged to the Metaphysical Club, which
met in Boston and Cambridge between 1770 and 1872 for philosophi-
cal conversation. 56 Peirce wrote the characteristic essay How to Make
Our Ideas Clear57 "lest the club should be dissolved, without leaving
any material souvenir behind. 58
For Blanshard, Wittgenstein's Tractatus is partly an unclear ex-
tension of How to Make Our Ideas Clear.5 9 Peirce, however, influ-
enced Wittgenstein predominately or exclusively through the
Cambridge University philosopher Ramsey. 6° Ramsey helped trans-
late the Tractatus from its original German, but did not meet
Wittgenstein until 1923, the year following publication of the
54. Id. (footnote omitted).
55. L. WTTGENsTEIN, supra note 47, at § 3.323.
56. See generally Speziale, By Their Fruits You Shall Know Them: Pragmatism and the Predic-
tion Theory of Law, 9 MANITOBA L.J. 29 (1978); Note, Holmes, Peirce and Legal Pragmatism, 84
YALE L.J. 1123 (1975).
57. C. PEIRCE, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, in 5 COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SAND-
ERS PEmICE §§ 5.388-.410 (1934).
58. C. PEmcE, Preface to 5 COLLECTED PAPERS § 5.13 (1934).
59. B. BLANSHARD, supra note 48, at 197.
60. Bambrough, Peirce, Wttgenstein, and Systematic Philosophy, 6 MIDWEST STUD. PfL. 263
(1981).
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Tractatus, and did not have the "innumerable conversations" that
presumably acquainted Wittgenstein with Peirce until 1929.61
IV.
Of Raffles and Wichelhaus, Holmes contended, and Gilmore de-
nied, that "each said a different thing. ' 62 Ordinarily, 'said' equals 'ut-
tered' or 'spoke'. This is Gilmore's use of 'said', the syntactical use
already discussed, 63 by which speakers say different things by saying
tokens of different types. By this use, Raffles and Wichelhaus said the
same thing, tokens of 'Peerless'; therefore, Holmes' contention was
false. Nevertheless, as previously argued, it is unlikely Holmes was
dissembling, or mistaken at the elementary level at which Gilmore
perceives error.
Of course, Holmes' use of 'said' may simply be deviant. Imagine,
then, Holmes used 'said' extraordinarily or idiosyncratically. What
he said would have been true, or not obviously false. Contrast Gl-
more's ordinary syntactical 'said' ('said1') with 'said' as Holmes hypo-
thetically used it ('said2'). The first constraint on 'said 2' is that it must
solve Raffles: distinguish between tokens of 'Peerless' as 'said1' does
not. The second constraint is that it must not, as does 'meant', make
subjective, nonexternal distinctions.
As observed, 'said,' distinguishes among expressions syntacti-
cally. Ordinarily, one contrasts syntax and semantics. Semantical
properties are specified by talking about "designata" of the expres-
sions-'"objects, properties, states of affairs, or the like." 64 That
'Peerless sails tomorrow' refers to T and that 'Wichelhaus' refers to
Wichelhaus are semantical properties of those expressions.
.Hence the obvious distinction to make is that 'said1' is syntacti-
cal; 'meant' is semantical. We know 'said2' like 'meant' distinguishes
expressions semantically. Gilmore was indisputably right that Raffles
and Wichelhaus spoke identically syntactically. According to
Holmes-whose use of 'said' governs 'said2'-the parties said different
things. Then 'said 2' is distinguished from 'said1' by being semantical
not syntactical; and from 'meant' by something within semantics.
61. L. WrrrGENSrEIN, LETTERS TO C. K. OGDEN app. 77, 87 (1973) (quoting L. WrrrGEN-
STEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS at x (3d ed. 1953)).
62. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 309.
63. See supra text accompanying note 39.
64. R. CARNAP, supra note 39, at 79.
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The contemporary philosopher Quine distinguishes between ref-
erence and meaning thus:
[T]here is a gulf between meaning and [reference] even in the case of a
singular term which is genuinely a name of an object .... The phrase
'Evening Star' [refers to] a certain large physical object of spherical form,
which is hurtling through space some scores of millions of miles from
here. The phrase 'Morning Star' [refers to] the same thing, as was proba-
bly first established by some observant Babylonian. But the two phrases
cannot be regarded as having the same meaning; otherwise that Babylo-
nian could have dispensed with his observations and contented himself
with reflecting on the meanings of his words. The meanings, then, must
be other than the [referred to] object, which is one and the same in both
cases.
65
The "gulf" Quine identifies is substantial: "When the cleavage be-
tween meaning and reference is properly heeded, the problems of
what is loosely called semantics become separated into two provinces
so fundamentally distinct as not to deserve a joint appellation at
all."'66 The salience of this division suggests we adopt it to distinguish
'said2' and 'meant'. Then, tentatively, 'said 2' relates to reference,
'meant' to meaning.
Meaning is interpretable as what decides reference. Accordingly,
'the morning star' would mean the last star visible at dawn; one know-
ing this can pick out the morning star. Alternatively, meaning is in-
terpretable as the pattern of references across contexts, by which 'the
morning star' refers to planet A here, to planet B in different circum-
stances, and so forth. Being syntactical, 'said 1' is extensional by de-
fault; 'said2' is still extensional, although semantical, not syntactical;
and 'meant' is both semantical and intensional.
The morning/evening star is, of course, Venus. 67 Imagine a one-
Peerless analogue of Raffles. Regard these functional equivalences:
'Venus' = 'Peerless'
'Evening Star'= 'Peerless, sailing in December'
'Morning Star' ='Peerless, sailing in October'
In the analogue, there is only one ship as there is only one star. Both
litigants said 'Peerless'; they referred to the same ship (by hypothesis,
65. W. QuINE, On What There Is, in FROM A LoGicAL PoiNT OF Vinw 1, 9 (2d ed. rev.
1961).
66. W. QumE, Notes on the Theory of Reference, in FROM A LOGICAL PoiNT OF ViEw 130,
130 (2d ed. rev. 1961).
67. The example is from G. FREGE, On Sense and Reference, in TRANSLATIONS FROM THE
PmLOsOPHIcAL WRIriNGS OF GOTTLOB FREGE 56, 57 (1952).
1985]
196 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
there is only one). Raffles said 'Peerless' meaning by it what 'Peerless,
sailing in December' means; Wichelhaus said 'Peerless' meaning by it
what 'Peerless, sailing in October' means. Hence one or both parties
mistook when Peerless sailed. By Holmes' reading of Raffles, the par-
ties in the analogue contracted. That they said1 identically or that
they meant differently does not matter; that they said2 identically
does. This difference regarding said2 causes the disparate results in
the analogue and in Raffles.
Holmes had to cut up the world as finely as did the Raffles court.
The resources of 'said1' did not let Holmes decide both Raffles and its
one-Peerless analogue: syntactically, Raffles and Wichelhaus said the
same thing, tokens of the type 'Peerless'. Holmes, supplementing
'said,' with 'said2', could make not only syntactical but also semanti-
cal distinctions; consequently, he could have Raffles and Wichelhaus
say different things. Tokens of the syntactical type 'Peerless' might be
distinguished as referring to different ships. In Raffles, the tokens did,
hence the parties did not contract. In the hypothetical one-Peerless
analogue, the tokens of 'Peerless' identically refer to this ship. The
parties said the same thing in the sense of 'said2', and contracted.
Holmes, using 'said1 ' and 'said2', could divide the world into as
many pieces as the Raffles court did, distinguishing among facts as
completely. He did not need 'meant', did not need to talk nonexten-
sionally. That Raffles and Wichelhaus might have meant different
things would not have mattered. Holmes by explaining the law with
'said 2' instead of 'meant' made the law speak extensionally, as
Wittgenstein wanted.68 The table below sums up the distinctions
made in this Part of the paper.
meant intensional
semantical I said2 j[ sad2 ]extensional
syntactical said, 
J
V.
Holmes wrote to Pollock in 1898, unpromisingly, from our per-
spective: "[A] proper name means only one person or thing though it
may idem sonans with another proper name, & you let in intent not to
68. See supra text accompanying note 52.
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find out what the speaker meant but what he said."' 69 Holmes' sen-
tence is nevertheless consonant with, or restates, the theory of Part
IV, if the boldface expressions are disambiguated or translated.
'means' = 'said 2' (the relation between a name and a thing named is
reference)70
'idem sonans' (sounding the same) = 'identical said,' (hearing having
replaced seeing as the represen-
tative mode of perception)
'meant' = 'meant'
'said' = 'said2'
Thus reformulated, the quoted passage goes:
A proper name says2 only one person or thing though it may say1 the
same thing as another proper name, & you let in intent not to find out
what the speaker meant but what he said2.
Holmes' letter to Pollock, thus translated, speaks as Part IV sug-
gests regarding reference and meaning; but insofar as Holmes admits
talk about intent at all, Part IV's theory is still in trouble. Moreover,
Holmes did not write the passage inadvertently; or if he did, he wrote
thus more than once. Elsewhere, Holmes said, citing Raffles, we "let
in evidence of intention," we "inquire what" a writer "meant," not
because this matters for itself, but "in order to find out what he has
said." 71
We must grasp the magnitude of the problem. Holmes wanted
contract to depend only on externals, to be independent of mental
things. Correspondingly, Wittgenstein wanted the world to consist
only of observable things talked about extensionally. The distinctions
'said,' makes are external in Holmes' sense, observable in Wittgen-
stein's; those 'meant' makes are not: so far so good. The trouble is
about whether the distinctions 'said2' makes are external or observa-
ble. If we admit intent to determine reference, reference has a mental
aspect.
It appears we do admit it. In Raffles, how did the parties, having
identically said 'Peerless', refer to different ships, unless by thinking of
different ships, intending to refer to different ships, having different
ships in mind? Holmes' program to objectify contract law collapses
69. Letter from Oliver Wendall Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Dec. 9, 1898), reprinted in 1
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETrERS 89, 90 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
70. See supra text accompanying note 65.
71. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REv. 417, 418 (1899).
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to the extent reference depends on the intent to refer, and he might as
well have talked immediately about what the parties meant.
Trurl's machine7 2 could create nonlinguistic things whose names
begin with 'n'. The tension in the idea of the machine comes from its
syntactical criterion for creating, coupled with the extensional seman-
tical naming relation with what it creates. So far, Holmes' objective
theory of contract has a like tension. Its test for contract is referen-
tial, thus extensional; but a judge must do intensional semantics to
locate the referent.
To see how partly to remove this impediment, pretend that Raf-
fles had come before the court having a different procedural posture:
that Milward, for Raffles, instead of demurring to Wichelhaus' plea
that the parties "meant and intended" different ships, joined issue
with Wichelhaus over the plea's factual claim (insofar as it was a fac-
tual claim). 73 Contemplate Wichelhaus' problem of proof.
It is hard to get the proof off the ground. Possibly, but improba-
bly, Wichelhaus would not have been permitted to testify about what
he intended to refer to. Wigmore makes and then disapproves of this
argument for exclusion, embraced avidly only in Alabama:
[S]ince a person's own intention can be known only to himself, his state-
ment of what it is or was cannot be safeguarded by the possibility of
exposing its falsity, through the aid either of conflicting circumstances or
of opposing eyewitnesses; ... thus the influence of self-interest in falsify-
ing is too dangerous, and ... such testimony should consequently be
forbidden. 74
A report by a witness of his mental state, if admissible, is unpersua-
sive. At best, Wichelhaus would have impressed no one by merely
testifying, 'I referred to October Peerless'.
The testimony on Wichelhaus' behalf must be about externals,
proceeding roughly as follows:
Q. What ship did you mean and intend?
Wichelhaus. October Peerless.
72. S. LEM, supra note 40, at 11. See 1 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 144 (2d ed. W. Stanford 1959).
Fischer reports a parallel instance of confusion within semantics: "Witness the legendary Ming
emperor who dealt with a dangerous river by a sort of semantical flood control project. Instead of
building dikes and dams, he changed its name from 'The Wild One' to 'The Peaceful One'." D.
FISCHER, HIsToRLANs' FALLACIES 22 (1970) (quoting H. KONIGSBURGER, LOVE AND HATE IN
CHINA 9 (1966)).
73. 2 H. & C. at 906, 159 Eng. Rep. at 375. Milward's litigation strategy is discussed in G.
GILMORE, supra note 9, at 35-39.
74. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1965, at 141 (rev. ed. 1978).
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Q. How do we know this?
Wichelhaus. I saw a schedule that referred to the ship; I never heard of
December Peerless.
Q. How do we know that October Peerless was referred to by this sched-
ule, and not December Peerless?
Publisher of schedule. I got my information about sailing dates directly
from the owner of October Peerless. I never heard of December Peerless.
Q. How do we know the information about sailing dates the publisher of
the schedule got from you referred to October Peerless?
Owner. October Peerless is my ship. My daughter christened it. I never
heard of December Peerless.
Daughter.. . . And then I swung this bottle at this boat, and said, "I
name you 'Peerless'."
Compare this mode of proof to the causal theory of reference,
adapted to the context of Raffles:
[A ship is christened; its owners call it] by a certain name. They talk
about [it] to their friends. Other people meet [it]. Through various sorts
of talk the name is spread from link to link as if by a chain. A speaker
who is on the far end of this chain. . . may be referring to [Peerless]
... A certain passage of communication reaching ultimately to the
[ship itself] does reach the speaker. . .. [A] chain of communication
going back to [Peerless] has been established, by virtue of [its] member-
ship in a community which passed the name on from link to link .... 75
The links of the chain discussed above are physical objects. An inter-
mediate link of the chain is caused by the preceeding link and causes
the succeeding link. The first link is the physical object being referred
to; the last link is the piece of language that does the referring.
It is striking that the form of the legal proof and the causal the-
ory of reference are congruent, the proof working backward along the
causal chain that the theory posits and depends on. Raffles involved
two causal chains. One chain ran from October Peerless through 'I
christen you 'Peerless" to 'I promise to buy cotton ex Peerless' (said
by Wichelhaus); the other ran from December Peerless through 'I
christen you 'Peerless" to 'I promise to sell cotton ex Peerless' (said
by Raffles).
75. S. KRiPKE, NAMING AND NECESSrrY 91 (1980). About Kripke, see generally Branch,
New Frontiers in American Philosophy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1977, § 6 (Magazine), at 12.
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VI.
Holmes' theory of contract formation then consists not of un-
qualifiedly syntactical sentences like:
If what A says1 is the same as what B sayst, .. there is a contract.
These are familiar from Part II. Syntax alone is insufficient. Conse-
quently, the theory contains extensional semantical sentences such as:
If what A says 2 is the same as what B says2,. . . there is a contract.
One may translate the second sentence thus using 'said1' and
reference:
IfwhatA says1 is the same as whatB saysl. . .and ifwhatA andB say
refer to the same things, there is a contract.
Here 'refer to the same things' is analyzed as 'be at the ends of causal
chains going back to the same things'.
From the vantage point of the causal theorist, the subjective, psy-
chological aspects of contract law are supplemental and insignificant.
Cause is believed to work exclusively by physical contact. 76 In gen-
eral, however, the links in a causal chain from an object to a token of
its name are not temporally and spatially contiguous. For example, in
Part V, the token 'Peerless' in the schedule of sailings caused
Wichelhaus to say 'Peerless' to Raffles elsewhere later. Thoughts pro-
vide the causal continuity. Typically, by the resulting theory, a token
of 'Peerless' causes a thought at time and place a. The thought per-
sists to time and place b, where it causes a succeeding token of
'Peerless'.
In two respects, Holmes' theory is incomplete. First, it fails
where causal chains run from both ships to the tokens of both liti-
gants, because then no test by externals conclusively establishes which
ship caused the saying of a given token. Perhaps the difficulty here is
just epistemological, that is, with what we know, in which case the
causal relation which determines reference is obscured, but exists.
Worse, the relation of reference itself may fail as a physical relation,
as it would if whether the litigants referred to the same ship depended
on their "intending to use the same reference."' 77 Either way, the very
objectivity that is the virtue of Holmes' theory is lost.
76. D. HuME, A TREATISE OF HuMAN NATURE 75 (2d ed. L. Selby-Bigge 1978) (1st ed.
London 1739).
77. S. KRiPKE, supra note 75, at 97.
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Second, whether or not an expression refers is sometimes decided
outside Holmes' theory. Deceptively, some apparently referring
pieces of language have nothing to refer to. Trurl's78 trouble occurred
because his machine started to create nothing-'nothing' begins with
'n'-and "after a while the world very definitely began to thin out
around Trurl. ' 79 Here the machine creates nothing, yet 'nothing' fails
to refer.
Consider this one-ship analogue to Raffles. Raffles and
Wichelhaus say, 'Peerless, sailing in October', or 'Peerless' unaug-
mented, meaning by this what 'Peerless sailing in October' means.
There is, however, only one Peerless, which sails in December.
Maybe the parties have contracted, maybe not. We may state the test
for their having contracted speaking only about reference: either the
tokens of 'Peerless' refer to Peerless, the parties mistaking a property
of the ship, in which case they contracted; or, nothing being both
Peerless and sailing in October, the tokens fail to refer to anything, in
which case they did not contract.
This is fine; which alternative is the case, however, is determined
by how important the ship's sailing date is, thus subjectively. The
problem, stated in the language of the causal theory, is whether the
putative causal chains or the parties' misapprehensions of the sailing
date caused the tokens 'Peerless'. Addressing this problem, we likely
do intensional semantics to determine reference, thus encountering
the law of mutual mistake or frustration.80
VII.
Gilmore had Holmes argue: 'It is possible to explain Raffles ob-
jectively. Of course, it can be explained subjectively too; however, a
subjective explanation is inconvenient, because businessmen must de-
cide by externals'.' The clause 'Of course. . .', imputed to Holmes,
which concedes the sufficiency of the subjective theory, underesti-
mates the force of Holmes' argument, which need not depend on the
relative convenience of competing successful explanations. Holmes,
instead, may be interpreted to argue that the subjective theory not
78. See supra text accompanying notes 40 and 72.
79. S. LEM, supra note 40, at 6.
80. This is a problem for another day, best approached through Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich.
568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887).
81. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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only is unnecessary, but also is insufficient. That is, reference is the
required ground to decide contract.
The expression 'subjective theory' equivocates. It may designate
a theory of meaning, as it does in Part IV. If, not implausibly, "differ-
ence in extension constitutes difference in meaning, '8 2 meaning in-
cludes, but goes beyond, reference. Oppositely, 'subjective theory'
may designate something purely psychological, a theory that depends
exclusively on mental representations. Such a theory would not relate
these representations to the world. This latter reading of 'subjective
theory' will be considered in Part VII.
As previously observed, 83 Holmes wanted a completely syntacti-
cal theory of contract, one that decides contract by shapes of language
tokens, but could not have it, Raffles being a counterexample. In Raf-
fles, the parties said the same thing syntactically, 'Peerless', but did
not contract. A completely psychological theory of contract fails too,
for the same reason. Imagine thought as silent, internal speech: to
think Peerless sails tomorrow is to speak to oneself, 'Peerless sails to-
morrow'. Expectedly, the parties' subvocalized speech un-
derdetermines contract; that the parties say the same things is
inconclusive. Instead, they contract or not depending on the refer-
ences of what they say.
Consider the identical Hanema twins.84 Raffles is acquainted
with one, Wichelhaus with the other. Despite the twins' being differ-
ent individuals, Raffles and Wichelhaus might have detailed identical
mental representations of them. For instance, both conceivably think,
"a fair soft brown-haired woman, thirty-four, going heavy in her
haunches and waist yet with a girl's fine hard ankles and a girl's tenta-
tive questing way of moving, as if the pure air were loosely packed
with obstructing cloths."8 5
Now, moving to the framework of Raffles, hypothesize that Raf-
fles says, 'I'll sell you. . . cotton shipped ex Peerless'; Wichelhaus
responds, 'I'll buy. . . cotton from you shipped ex Peerless'; and "the
actual state[s] of the parties' minds" 86 are indistinguishable, as is their
syntax:
82. H. PUTNAM, Computational Psychology and Interpretation Theory, in 3 PHILOSOPICAL
PAPERS 139, 145 (1983).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 28 & 45.
84. The illustration is from . UPDIKE, COUPLES (1968).
85. Id at 3.
86. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 309.
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We may suppose that [Raffles and Wichelhaus] have the same 'mental
representation' of ['Peerless'], that they have the same beliefs in connec-
tion with [Peerless], etc .... [I]t would seem that we should say that the
content of the mental representation of ['Peerless'] is exactly the same for
[Rames and Wichelhaus]. . .. [T]here is nothing 'psychological,' noth-
ing 'in their heads', which constitutes the difference...;.. .it is in the
reference of the word, as objectively fixed by the practices of the commu-
nity, and not in the conceptions of [Peerless] entertained by [Raffles and
Wichelhaus]. 87
Again, the parties will have contracted or not, depending on refer-
ence, despite both their words and their thoughts being congruent.
Their psychology, like their language, is incapable of deciding
whether they contract. "If God had looked into our minds,"
Wittgenstein said, "he would not have been able to see there whom we
were speaking of."88
Raffles is adequate but not absolute proof that the subjective the-
ory is insufficient. It may be doubted because, as Gilmore observed,
the court should have decided the parties agreed any Peerless would
do. If 'ex Peerless' meant merely if the ship were lost the contract
would end, Raffles losing the cotton, while not responsible to
Wichelhaus for not delivering it, 'Peerless' did not refer. This reading
is more probable if both parties' mental representations are consistent
with either ship.89
Kyle v. Kavanaugh9° clinches the point that the subjective theory
is insufficient. In Kyle, the parties might have known the properties
only under the description 'on Prospect Street'. The contents of their
thoughts would have been identical, without respect to which prop-
erty these thoughts were about. But the parties in Kyle had to con-
tract concerning some specific property, or not at all.
CONCLUSION
According to the teaching criticized, Holmes replaced the suffi-
cient subjective theory of contract formation by the objective theory,
which decides contract by observables, but is inconsistent with the
case law (Raffles). It has been shown there is no simple subjective-
objective dichotomy. Instead, the analysis has distinguished four
theories.
87. H. PuTNAM, supra note 82, at 144-45.
88. L. WrrroENSTEIN, PILOSOPmCAL INVESTIGATIONS 217 (3d ed. 1958).
89. See G. GILMORE, supra note 9, at 35-39.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
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(1) Syntactical.-Signalled by 'said1'. By (1), the most objective,
parties contract if their language tokens are congruent. Raffles refutes
this theory (Kyle does too). Parties who speak identically syntacti-
cally, who, for example, both say 'Peerless', need not contract.
(2) Referential.-Signalled by 'said2'. By (2), semantical, not
syntactical, parties contract if their language tokens refer to the same
things. But it is extensional, and explains Raffles: the parties' tokens
'Peerless', syntactically identical, referred to different ships. If the
causal theory of reference succeeds, (2) depends on observables.
(3) Meaning-Based.-Signalled by 'meant'. By (3), the parties
contract if, say, their language tokens have the same patterns of refer-
ences across possible situations. This theory is, like (2), semantical.
Yet it is also intensional. It too explains Raffles, if only because it
subsumes (2). But it makes excessive, impractical distinctions.
(4) Psychological.-Perhaps also signalled by 'meant'. By (4),
parties contract if they think identically. (4) is the subjective counter-
part of (1), thought replacing language. It is equally insufficient: par-
ties can think identically, exactly as they can speak identically,
without contracting.
All that survives of Gilmore's teaching is that Holmes replaced
one theory by another, better at deciding by observables. Of the four
theories, Holmes adopted (2), the referential theory of contract forma-
tion, at once adequate, as (1) and (4) are not, and minimally so, as (3)
is not.
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